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Unemployment and the UK labour 
market before, during and after 
the Golden Age 
T I M O T H Y J . H A T T O N † A N D G E O R G E R . BOYER‡ 
†Australian National University and University of Essex 
‡Cornell University 
During the ‘golden age’ of the 1950s and 1960s unemployment in Britain 
averaged 2 per cent. This was far lower than ever before or since and a 
number of hypotheses have been put forward to account for this unique 
period in labour market history. But there has been little attempt to isolate 
precisely how the determinants of wage setting and unemployment differed 
before, during and after the golden age. We estimate a two-equation model 
over the whole period from 1872 to 1999 using a newly constructed set of 
long-run labour market data. We find that the structure of real wage 
setting was different in the golden age, consistent with notions about the 
postwar consensus, but it did not result in wages that were significantly 
lower relative to productivity than during other eras. Rapid growth in 
productivity and world trade together with low interest rates did keep 
unemployment lower during the golden age than after the 1970s. But the 
key difference between the golden age and the periods before and after was 
shifts in labour demand that are not accounted for by any of the variables 
that are usually thought to determine the equilibrium unemployment rate. 
1 . Introduct ion 
Between 1947 and 1973 the unemployment rate in Britain averaged a mere 
2.1 per cent. On this key indicator, UK labour market performance was 
dramatically better than ever before or since. Dur ing the 1970s, as the 
unemployment rate crept inexorably upwards, there was a widely shared 
belief that the performance of the 1950s and 1960s was (or had become) 
the norm. Governments grappled with what they believed were exceptional 
circumstances, under the assumption that the conditions of the ‘golden age’ 
could be recreated. But as high rates of unemployment persisted throughout 
the 1980s and into the 1990s, the golden age began to look more and more 
We are grateful for comments on an earlier version of this article from George 
Chouliarakis, participants at the Economic History Society Conference at Durham, 
April, 2003, the editors and two anonymous referees. 
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like an anomaly - albeit one that lasted for quarter of a century. Comparisons 
with the interwar years and earlier only served to reinforce that point. In the 
last few years, with the fall in unemployment to levels last seen in the 1970s, 
there has been some speculation that Britain may be entering a new era of 
sustained low unemployment reminiscent of the ‘golden age’. 
A fundamental premise of this article is that such long-term shifts in 
average unemployment rates need to be studied in an appropriately long-
term context. While there is a large econometric literature that seeks to 
explain the rise in unemployment since the 1960s, very few observers have 
pushed the analysis further back in time. On the other hand, historical 
studies that examine the period before 1914 or the interwar period in isolation 
completely miss the fundamental shifts in labour market performance across 
the two World Wars.1 Here we examine a new database that we have 
developed of historically-consistent labour market series going back to 1870. 
With this we can compare and contrast the golden age of the 1950s and 
1960s with periods both before and after in order more precisely to isolate 
whether, and if so why, the performance of the golden age was so different 
from the rest of UK labour market history. 
The next section looks at key indicators that might be expected to 
determine unemployment over broad economic eras. This is followed by a 
discussion of several potential explanations for the unusually low unemploy-
ment during the golden age. We then set out a two-equation model from 
which the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU) 
can be derived. These equations are estimated using our long-run dataset 
and the NAIRU, calculated for 1948–1971, is compared with that for other 
periods under different counterfactual assumptions. Finally, we examine the 
effects of economic trends in the 1970s when the golden age seems to have 
evaporated. Our findings are summed up in a short conclusion. 
2. Unemployment in the long run 
Our long-run consistent unemployment series is plotted in Figure 1. This 
series differs a little from those previously available, especially before World 
War 1. Between 1946 and 1973 unemployment was always lower than the 
lowest rate recorded in any other period, with the exception of the few years 
of intense boom and inflation immediately after World War 1. The interwar 
years and the period from 1974 onwards exhibit very high unemployment 
rates with wide fluctuations, while before 1913 both the mean and the 
amplitude were somewhat lower. The most important point stemming from 
Figure 1 is that patterns of unemployment differ sharply across periods of 
1
 Hatton (1988), Broadberry (1994) and Bianchi and Zoega (1997) are among the few 
studies that estimate models of unemployment that span two or more of these economic 
eras. 
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Figure 1. UK unemployment rate, 1870–1999. 
20 years or more, and it is the differences between these periods, rather 
than variations within each, that demand explanation. Accordingly Table 1 
provides averages of key indicators for five periods between 1871 and 1999. 
The means and standard deviations of the unemployment rate speak for 
themselves, but these major periods differ in other ways too. Nominal wages 
and prices were relatively stable before the First World War, and drifted 
downwards from 1921. By contrast there was persistent inflation in the 
postwar period, gradually accelerating until the mid-1970s. 
Table 1 also includes a number of variables that have typically been used 
in studies of unemployment and for which we have derived long-run series 
that are as consistent as possible over the long run. Much attention has 
been lavished on the unemployment benefit replacement ratio (Benjamin 
and Kochin 1979, Minford 1983). From 1921 it represents the weekly rate 
of unemployment insurance benefit for a man claiming for a wife and two 
children relative to the average manual wage rate. Before the First World 
War it is the average rate of unemployment benefit for males in trade unions 
that operated benefit funds, also relative to the average manual wage. On 
this measure the replacement rate was slightly lower during the golden age 
than it was either in the interwar period or after 1973. But as has been 
pointed out, these differences seem too small to explain much of the large 
shift in unemployment performance between the interwar period and the 
early postwar period, or between the golden age and the post-1973 period 
(Metcalf et al. 1982). Before the First World War our calculated replacement 
rate for trade unionists is broadly similar to the unemployment insurance 
rates for later periods. It fell slightly over time as nominal wage rates rose. 
18.00 1 
16.00 -
14.00 
12.00 -
10.00 
8.00 
6.00 
4.00 
2.00 
0.00 
Year 
38 European Review of Economic History 
Table I. Five economic eras. 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Standard deviation of 
unemployment rate 
Average rate of price 
inflation (% p.a.) 
Average rate of wage 
inflation (% p.a.) 
Replacement rate (%) 
Percentage of labour 
force covered by 
benefit schemes 
Trade union density (%) 
Coverage of national 
collective bargaining (%) 
Fuel price index/GDP 
deflator (1913 = 100) 
Import price/GDP 
deflator (1913 = 100) 
Income tax and social 
insurance contributions/ 
nominal G D P (%) 
Labour productivity 
growth (% p.a.) 
Structural change index 
Real interest rate (%) 
Growth of world trade 
volume (% p.a.) 
1871-1891 
5-5 
1.83 
- 0 . 4 
0 . 9 
51.8 
2 . 6 
6 . 1 
— 
70.1 
119.0 
1.1 
1.07 
2 .26 
3.49 
3.73 
1892-1913 
6 . 2 
1.31 
0 . 5 
1.2 
43-3 
7-i 
13.0 
10.4 
82 .8 
97.6 
1.8 
0.77 
1.97 
2.39 
3.31 
1921-1938 
10.9 
3 .00 
- 2 . 4 
- 1 . 6 
51.6 
65.9 
27.1 
42 .3 
92.1 
68.4 
10.3 
1.55 
4 . 0 4 
5.70 
2 .08 
1947-1973 
2 . 1 
0.69 
4.6 
7 - 2 
45-3 
99 .0 
44-4 
72 .0 
193.6 
83.5 
18.9 
2 .40 
2.33 
1.25 
7.43 
1 9 7 4 - 1 9 9 9 
10.1 
3.88 
7-4 
8.8 
48.4 
100.0 
4i-7 
65.3 
304 .2 
69 .0 
23.4 
1.69 
2 .24 
2 .66 
4.44 
Sources: See Appendix. 
However, only a very small proportion of the labour force was covered 
by these schemes. With the advent of unemployment insurance, coverage 
expanded to about two-thirds of the labour force during the interwar period, 
becoming universal from 1948. 
Much has also been made of the effects of trade unions, which, by 
bargaining up the wage, created higher unemployment. Before the First 
World War unionism was patchy and it increased in fits and starts, with overall 
density reaching 22 per cent in 1913. Unionism increased sharply during the 
First World War to a peak of 45 per cent in 1920 before a gradual decline 
set in. The peak of 1920 was recovered and sustained during the golden age, 
rising to 53 per cent in 1978 before declining during the Thatcher era. While 
the post-Thatcher decline in the strength of trade unions has been linked 
with improved unemployment performance, this hypothesis does not look 
so promising in a longer-term perspective. The period when unionism was 
sustained at its highest level was precisely the time when unemployment was 
at its lowest. Looking at the coverage of collective bargaining rather than at 
union membership reinforces that point. The coverage of national collective 
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agreements increased by 30 percentage points between the interwar period 
and the golden age, eventually declining during the 1980s. 
Some observers point to other variables that drive a wedge between 
employers’ costs and net real wages as a source of wage resistance that can 
create unemployment. Several of these ‘wedge’ terms are included in Table 1. 
The share of direct tax in national income (as measured by income tax and 
National Insurance contributions, not all of which would have fallen on 
labour) increased across the eras with the major hikes occurring across the 
two world wars. The ratio of import prices to the GDP deflator fell across 
the First World War and then increased between the interwar period and the 
golden age. Insofar as lower import prices reduce the cost of living relative 
to output prices, this should have reduced wage pressure during the interwar 
period and in the post-1973 period as compared with the golden age or the 
period before 1913. Yet these were precisely the eras when unemployment 
was highest. 
In addition it is often argued that the sharp rise in fuel prices that occurred 
with the oil shocks of the 1970s increased costs and reduced employment. 
The fuel price index in Table 1 is a weighted average of the crude oil price 
and the pithead price of coal relative to the GDP deflator, with the weights 
reflecting the changing composition of energy use. While this index increases 
by about 50 per cent between the golden age and the post-1973 periods, there 
is an even sharper increase in the relative fuel price (mainly coal) of 100 per 
cent between the interwar period and the golden age. 
Thus while some of these wedge terms may help explain the rise in 
unemployment across the 1970s (particularly oil prices), like the variables 
previously discussed, they move in the wrong direction to help explain why 
unemployment fell so dramatically across the Second World War. Thus 
Broadberry (1994, p. 246) finds that the model estimated by Layard and 
Nickell (1985) for the postwar period predicts that unemployment should 
have been even lower in the interwar period than it was in the early postwar 
years. 
3. Alternative hypotheses 
As previous observers have noted, it is hard to explain the broad sweep of 
British labour market history in terms of the wage pressure variables and/or 
relative price effects. There seem to be two alternative hypotheses. The first 
is that there are other variables, omitted from the discussion so far, which 
had effects sufficiently powerful that they more than offset the negative effects 
of wage pressure variables during the golden age as compared with other 
periods. The second is that the forces that would normally raise the equili-
brium unemployment level were suspended or went into abeyance during 
the golden age, such that there was a shift in the relationship between un-
employment and its determinants in that period as compared with all others. 
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Some variables representing the first hypothesis are included at the bottom 
of Table i. One possibility is that structural change was slower or somehow 
more benign during the golden age than in the adjacent periods. The 
structural change index measures structural shifts between 12 sectors that 
comprise the whole economy and it is similar in principle to that used 
by Matthews et al. (1982). But here it is calculated on an annual basis 
and it therefore represents short-run turbulence rather than medium-term 
structural change. As the Table shows, structural change was greater on 
average during the interwar period than at other times, supporting the 
views of some economic historians (for instance, Booth and Glynn 1975). 
But across the other eras it seems to have been broadly similar, despite 
considerable annual variation within each period. 
Another candidate is labour productivity growth. As outlined further 
below, faster productivity growth can reduce unemployment if employment 
depends on the ‘gap’ between the real wage and labour productivity, and 
if the real wage adjusts only slowly to current productivity. This approach 
has been invoked to explain high unemployment in response to productivity 
shocks in the 1920s (Broadberry 1990) and in the 1970s (Bruno and Sachs 
1985), and it has recently returned to prominence (Ball and Moffitt 2001, 
Ball and Mankiw 2002). As Table 1 shows, labour productivity grew faster 
during the golden age than over any other period of comparable length. It 
therefore seems capable of explaining some of the cross-period differences 
in average unemployment rates. 
It has also been argued - most famously by Matthews (1968) - that 
aggregate demand was higher and more stable during the 1950s and 1960s 
than in the preceding eras. However, that view neglects the supply side and 
begs the question of why a high level of aggregate demand was not quickly 
translated into price and wage inflation that ultimately restored the level of 
unemployment to its pre-existing equilibrium level. One possibility is that 
demand shocks were more often positive during the golden age than at other 
times. A crude measure of external demand shocks is the rate of growth of 
world trade. As Table 1 shows, world trade grew at an average rate of between 
3 and 4 per cent up to 1913 and then a series of negative shocks reduced 
its average growth rate in the well-known deglobalisation process that took 
place during the interwar period. But between 1948 and 1973 the volume of 
world trade grew at twice the rate of the earlier era of globalisation before 
1914. This too seems consistent with the superior performance of the golden 
age and, to some extent, with the return to higher unemployment after 1973. 
Another candidate is the real interest rate. While low interest rates might 
raise aggregate demand through stimulating investment (which, indeed, was 
higher during the golden age than previously), this again is a demand side 
effect. In so far as investment results in capital deepening its effect on real 
labour demand this should be reflected in faster productivity growth, as 
already noted. However it has been suggested that, through a variety of 
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mechanisms, interest rates might shift the real demand for labour, either by 
reducing the present value of fixed labour costs, or by stimulating investment 
to attract or retain customers (Phelps 1994, Phelps and Zoega 1998). 
A further elaboration on this general theme is that demand or supply 
shocks matter more when they interact with labour market institutions that 
are seen as adverse to employment, some of which are represented by the wage 
pressure variables described above. Thus, variables that weaken the pressure 
of high unemployment on wage adjustment tend to magnify the impact 
of shocks and prolong their effects. One example would be where an 
increase in the rate of structural change leads to higher and more persistent 
unemployment the higher is the benefit replacement ratio (Ljungqvist and 
Sargent 1998). Evidence for OECD countries offers some support for the 
view that variables such as the benefit replacement ratio, benefit duration, 
employment protection and union density, when interacted with shocks to 
employment, help to explain both the differences across countries in the 
rise of unemployment from the 1970s and its persistence into the 1990s 
(Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000, Bertola et al. 2001). 
The second hypothesis is that the behaviour of the labour market was 
radically different during the golden age than it was at other times. Perhaps 
the most persuasive notion is that the ‘postwar consensus’ engendered co-
operation between employers’ leaders and trade unions that was absent 
before the Second World War and that collapsed during the 1970s. Accounts 
that stress this view see a three-way implicit contract between employers, 
trade unions and the government. Increasingly centralised trade unions 
co-ordinated moderation in their wage claims, refraining from using their 
increased industrial muscle at the national level and restraining militancy 
at the local and firm levels. In exchange, employers acceded to union 
control of restrictive practices at the workplace while maintaining high 
levels of investment. The contract was underpinned by the government, 
which committed to an expanded welfare state and to using Keynesian-style 
macroeconomic policies to maintain economic stability. 
One variant of this approach emphasises the degree of centralisation in 
the bargaining structure and the degree of co-ordination in wage bargaining 
across sectors (Calmfors and Driffill 1988, Soskice 1991). When unions are 
strong but the bargaining structure is fragmented and unco-ordinated, indi-
vidual wage bargains do not take into account the economy-wide effects of 
the bargains independently struck in each sector. This lack of co-ordination is 
illustrated by Keynes’ comment a year before the general strike of i926:‘Our 
export industries are suffering because they are the first to be asked to 
accept the 10 per cent [wage] reduction. If every one was accepting a similar 
reduction at the same time, the cost of living would fall, so that the lower 
money wage would represent nearly the same real wage as before. But, in 
fact, there is no machinery for effecting a simultaneous reduction’ (Keynes 
1931, p. 247). 
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This situation can be contrasted with two extremes. With atomistic wage 
bargaining at the local or firm level, wage bargainers take into account the 
effect on employment of the high elasticity of demand faced by the individual 
firm in an industry. Thus potential job losses lead to moderation in wage 
claims. At the other extreme, when wage setting is co-ordinated through an 
encompassing institutional wage structure, a wage increase affects all firms 
equally. But centralised wage setters are more likely to take into account the 
economy-wide effects of their actions and therefore to co-ordinate on a set 
of wage bargains that would be consistent with high employment. 
It is tempting to associate low unemployment during the golden age with 
a high level of centralised co-operation in which sectional interests were 
suppressed. Indeed, a number of influential studies have seen this postwar 
consensus as a unique phase in British industrial relations (Middlemass 1979, 
Flanagan et al. 1983, Eichengreen 1996, Eichengreen and Iversen 1999). 
Table 1 provides evidence that national collective bargaining covered nearly 
three-quarters of employment during the golden age, with some decline 
subsequently. But wage bargaining was still very fragmented between and 
within sectors and it is hard to believe that industrial relations structures 
were sufficiently different during the golden age, as compared to the periods 
before and after, to have delivered a quarter-century of low unemployment. 
Those studies that stress the influence of the postwar consensus emphasise 
the shift towards co-operation in the leadership of government, industry and 
unions within an institutional framework that changed only slowly, rather 
than changes in the structure itself.2 The tripartite agreement that underlay 
the 1944 White Paper on Employment Policy worked well up to the late 
1950s, but as the spirit of co-operation ebbed the edifice of the corporatist 
structure was strengthened. These developments included amalgamations 
among trade unions and among employers’ associations, the setting up of 
the National Economic Development Council (in 1961), the introduction of 
statutory incomes policy (in 1966), and new industrial relations legislation 
(in 1969 and 1971).3 
The system was thrown into crisis as the wave of industrial unrest that 
had been building since the late 1960s was followed by oil price shocks, 
a productivity slowdown, and subsequent tightening of macroeconomic 
policy. While a semblance of co-operation continued through the 1970s, the 
corporatist approach was finally (and definitively) buried by the Thatcher 
government that came to office in 1979. Thus the rise and fall of the 
2
 Even this spirit of consensus had its limitations. According to Crouch (1995, p. 236) ‘it 
was the kind of consensus that arises when groups put the avoidance of conflict above the 
search for agreement’. 
3
 Middlemass (1979, p. 425) notes that ‘Symptoms of excessive formalism and lack of 
flexibility began to appear in all parts of the system during the 1960s’ and that ‘the parties 
to the triangular system had become formal, professional organizations to a degree 
unforseen in the 1940s’. 
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postwar consensus fits rather well with the profile of unemployment and 
it is not surprising that the two have been linked. But the evidence is largely 
circumstantial. To date there has been no quantitative analysis to show that, 
as a result of the postwar consensus, real wages (and hence unemployment) 
were lower than they would otherwise have been. 
4. A benchmark model of the labour market 
Here we develop a basic framework within which to examine the effects 
of wage pressure variables and other determinants of unemployment over 
the long run (see Hatton 2003). Like most models of this type, it consists 
of a wage-setting equation and an unemployment equation from which 
an expression for the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment 
(NAIRU) can be derived. 
The real wage equation is written, with all variables in natural logs, as: 
A(w — p) t = (30 + PjA^t + P2(7tt-i — (w — p) t-i) — P3ut_! +x t (1) 
where w — pis the real wage, it is labour productivity, u is the unemployment 
rate, and x represents a vector of wage pressure variables, including a 
stochastic error term. This may be thought of as embodying the components 
of the feasible wage, as represented by labour productivity, and the target 
wage as reflected in the negative relationship between lagged unemployment 
and the real wage.4 The dynamics are captured as an error correction 
mechanism such that the real wage adjusts slowly towards its determinants. 
In the long run, with the real wage and productivity constant, the real wage 
is a markup on productivity that depends on unemployment and the wage 
pressure variables.5 
The unemployment equation is an inverted (nominal) Phillips curve: 
ut = oco + cxiut-! - oc2AApt - a3An t - a4(7it_i - (w - p) t_ :) + zt (2) 
Where AAp is the change in nominal price inflation and z includes labour 
demand shift variables as well as a stochastic term. A positive price surprise 
has a negative effect on unemployment but there is also persistence (or 
hysteresis), as represented by the lagged dependent variable. The third term 
implies that productivity growth drives down unemployment in the short 
run. According to the fourth term, unemployment also depends negatively 
on the gap between productivity and the real wage lagged one period. This 
can be thought of as a dynamic labour demand equation where there is a 
short-run positive relationship between the real wage and the unemployment 
4
 See Layard et al. (1991) and Nickell (1998) for expositions of this general approach. 
5
 Thus, ignoring time subscripts, in the long-run stationary state (setting the As to zero): 
w — p = 71 + (P0 — P u + x)/P2. 
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rate. In the long run, with no inflation surprise and the real wage equal to 
productivity, unemployment depends purely on the factors in z that shift 
labour demand.6 
From equations (i) and (2) the NAIRU can be derived for constant values 
of the exogenous variables (denoted by *), but assuming productivity growth 
at a constant rate g*, and setting the inflation surprise A Ap = 0. This gives 
the NAIRU as: 
t oco + oc4po/p2 + z* + oc4x*/P2 - [oc3 + oc4(i - p:) / p2]g* 
u = i-a1+a4p3 /p2 (3) 
Thus the NAIRU will be affected positively by the wage/price pressure 
variables x and z, and it will be a negative function of the steady-state rate of 
productivity growth. The effects of these variables on the NAIRU will be 
greater the longer are the lags in wage and unemployment adjustment (the 
smaller is p2 and the larger is o^). They will be smaller the bigger the effect 
of unemployment on wage setting (the greater is P3) and of productivity on 
unemployment (the greater is oc4).7 
5. The real wage equation 
Estimates of a real wage adjustment equation based on equation (1) above 
appear in Table 2. The data period excludes the two World Wars and it also 
excludes the years 1972 to 1979. This is the transitional period during which 
the postwar consensus (if there was one) was breaking down. Rather than 
pick an arbitrary break somewhere in the 1970s, we examine differences 
in the structure of wage setting before and after the breakdown. We then 
explore further below the question of how well the model predicts the rise in 
unemployment over those years. 
The first column of Table 2 is a baseline estimate that is explored more 
fully in Hatton (2003) and it includes period dummies for the interwar years, 
the golden age and the post-1979 periods. The coefficient on unemployment 
is negative as expected for a wage setting function, although it has only 
borderline significance. Productivity growth and the lagged productivity 
to real wage ratio are both positive, giving strong support for a partial 
adjustment mechanism linking the real wage to productivity. The ratio of 
fuel prices to the GDP deflator was found to influence the real wage only 
in changes rather than in levels and with a negative coefficient. The relative 
import price has a negative effect in levels (at least in the baseline model) 
and the effect is also negative, suggesting that an increase in import prices 
reduces the real wage in the long run. 
6
 Again, setting the As to zero and ignoring time subscripts: u = (a0 + z)/(i — ar). 
7
 These stated effects for changes in the magnitudes of a4 and P2 require that 
(1 — P:)(i — a) > P3a4. 
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T a b l e 2. Real wage estimates, 1872-1913, 1922-38, 1948-71, 1980-99. 
Dependent variable 
Constant 
Log unemployment 
rate (t — 1) 
Alog productivity (t) 
Log productivity (t — 1) 
- log real wage (t — 1) 
Alog relative fuel 
price (t) 
Log relative import 
price (t — 1) 
1922-38 
1948-71 
1980-99 
Replacement rate (t — 1) 
ATrade union density (t) 
Direct tax share (t — 1) 
Replacement rate (t — 1) 
x 1948-71 
ATrade union density 
(t) x 1948-71 
Direct tax share (t - 1) 
x 1948-71 
Adj. R2 
D.W. 
R E S E T 
H E T E R O 
Alog (W/P) t 
O.150 
(3-0) 
- 0 . 0 0 9 
(i-9) 
0-534 
(6.4) 
0.407 
(6-5) 
- 0 . 0 3 2 
(2.9) 
- 0 . 0 2 7 
(2.7) 
- 0 . 0 0 7 
(1.2) 
0.048 
(4-5) 
0.034 
(4-9) 
0.48 
1.67 
4.12 
1.94 
Alog (W/P) t 
0.140 
(2.2) 
-O .OII 
(2.1) 
O.524 
(6.2) 
0.397 
(5-3) 
- 0 . 0 3 3 
(3-o) 
- 0 . 0 2 5 
d-9) 
0.017 
(i-3) 
0.024 
(0.9) 
0.096 
(0.03) 
0.015 
(0.5) 
0.021 
(0.2) 
- 0 . 0 9 2 
(0.7) 
0.47 
1.72 
8.46 
1.62 
Alog (W/P) t 
0.066 
(i-o) 
- 0 . 0 1 7 
(3-3) 
0.461 
(5-4) 
0.340 
(4-6) 
- 0 . 0 3 1 
(2.8) 
- 0 . 0 0 7 
(0.5) 
- 0 . 0 4 1 
(i-3) 
0.100 
(0.7) 
0.028 
(4-i) 
0.158 
(2.9) 
0.506 
(i-7) 
-0 .352 
(2.7) 
0.45 
1.77 
1.37 
1.31 
Alog (W/P) t 
0.035 
(4-5) 
- 0 . 0 1 8 
(4.2) 
0.461 
(5-4) 
0.297 
(5-2) 
- 0 . 0 3 0 
(2.8) 
0.198 
(6.0) 
0.130 
(2.7) 
0.676 
(2.6) 
- 0 . 3 3 0 
(2.7) 
0.45 
1.80 
0.78 
0.45 
Notes: ‘t’ statistics in parentheses. RESET is the functional form test using the powers of the 
fitted values, distributed as F(3jn_k). HETERO is the test for heteroskedasticity using the 
fitted values, distributed as /L 
More notable is the effect of the period dummies, which are positive and 
significant for the golden age and post-1979. Contrary to what might be 
expected from the literature on the postwar consensus, the real wage was not 
lower during the golden age than at other times, once labour productivity and 
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unemployment are taken into account. Whatever else the postwar consensus 
may have done, it did not reduce average unemployment by reducing the 
real wage relative to productivity. However, this estimate does not include 
wage pressure variables and it is possible that, once these are taken into 
account, a negative wage effect might emerge during the golden age. This is 
tested in column (2) where three additional variables are added. The first is 
the benefit replacement rate adjusted to allow for the changing coverage of 
benefit systems, and lagged one period. This produces a coefficient that is 
positive but small and highly insignificant. The second additional variable is 
trade union density, a variable usually thought to represent the strength of 
trade unions in wage bargaining. This is included as the change rather than 
as the level, which would be consistent with the idea that trade unions exert 
leverage chiefly during periods of expansion. Here the coefficient is positive 
as expected but again it is small and insignificant. The third additional 
variable is the direct tax wedge, which is negative and also insignificant. 
The inclusion of the wage pressure variables in column (2) reduces the 
period dummies to insignificance but it does not support the idea that these 
variables had much influence over the period as a whole. It could be, however, 
that these variables had different effects during the golden age than they 
did in other periods. Accordingly, in column (3) the period dummies are 
eliminated but the wage pressure variables are interacted with the dummy 
variable for the period 1948–71. The result indicates that the replacement 
rate and trade union growth exerted more influence during the golden age 
than at other times, and not less, as a casual reading of the literature on the 
postwar consensus might suggest. But it is consistent with Broadberry (1994) 
who also finds that these variables had larger effects after the Second World 
War than they did during the interwar period. However it is something of a 
surprise to find that the replacement rate and unionism had no discernible 
effects before and after the golden age. That finding is not overturned when 
union density is included as a level, or when different lags are used, or when 
the pre-1914 period is excluded. 
The pattern of coefficients of the more parsimonious specification in 
column (4) suggests a rather different interpretation of labour market 
structure during the golden age. As is often noted, moderation in national 
wage bargaining was largely undone by vigorous and sometimes militant 
activity led by shop stewards at the firm and local level. As a result, national 
wage bargains were topped up by wage supplements negotiated at the 
plant and firm level, such that earnings persistently increased faster than 
national wage rates - a process that became known as ‘wage drift’.8 The 
bargaining strength of shop stewards is likely to have depended more on 
strength of numbers than did national negotiations, and they are likely to 
See Fallick and Elliot (1981). 
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have been more responsive to the level of support for members who lost their 
jobs. 
Equally notable are the coefficients on the share of direct tax in national 
income. These indicate that before and after the golden age, the tax wedge 
tended to increase the real wage.9 By contrast, during the golden age that 
seemingly strong effect disappeared and was even slightly reversed. Insofar 
as increases in the tax share reflected the expansion of the welfare state, 
this did not add to wage pressure during the golden age. Thus the impact 
of the postwar consensus on the wage bargain appears to be the following. 
Before and after the golden age workers’ bargaining power was weak and the 
target wage was the private wage; during the golden age bargaining power 
was stronger but the target wage was the social wage. These two forces 
operated in opposite directions with the result that, relative to the economic 
fundamentals, the real wage was no lower during the golden age than it was 
at other times. 
6. The unemployment equation 
Estimates of the equation for unemployment, based on equation (2) above 
appear in Table 3. Again, the baseline specification in the first column is 
explored more fully in Hatton (2003). This version includes two lags of the 
dependent variable reflecting the dynamics of employment adjustment. The 
change in inflation (the Phillips curve term) reflecting the price surprise 
is significantly negative as expected. Productivity growth and the lagged 
productivity to real wage ratio are also negative, the latter supporting the 
view that the higher is the real wage relative to productivity the higher is 
unemployment. The relative fuel price is positively related to unemployment 
(as a level rather than as a change) even though the oil shocks of the 1970s 
are excluded. Of the three period dummies, the most important is that for 
the golden age which gives a large negative coefficient. This is not surprising 
since, as was noted earlier, the postwar consensus did not generate real wages 
that were lower than at other times. Hence the unusually low unemployment 
in the golden age must be accounted for by other variables - in this case the 
period dummy. 
The second column of Table 3 adds three additional variables that might 
help to explain shifts in the average unemployment rate that are accounted 
for by the period dummies in the first column. The real interest rate is sig-
nificantly positive, supporting the view that it works through channels other 
than investment and capital deepening (since labour productivity is already 
taken into account). The growth in the volume of world trade (a proxy 
9
 This finding is consistent with the Thatcher government’s sudden shift from direct to 
indirect taxes in the 1980 budget and with the establishment of a new tax-and-price index 
to represent changes in the cost of living. 
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Table 3. Unemployment rate estimates, 1872-1913, 1922-38, 1948-71, 
1980-99. 
Dependent variable 
Constant 
Log unemployment 
rate (t — 1) 
Log unemployment 
rate (t — 2) 
AAlog price level (t) 
Alog productivity (t) 
Log productivity (t — 1) 
- log real wage (t — 1) 
Log relative fuel price (t — 1) 
Log relative import 
price (t — 1) 
1922-38 
1948-71 
1980-99 
Real interest rate (t — 1) 
Alog world trade (t) 
Structural change 
index ( t ) 
Real interest rate 
( t - 1) x 1948-71 
Alog world trade 
(t) x 1948-71 
Structural change 
(t) x 1948-71 
Adj. R2 
D.W. 
R E S E T 
H E T E R O 
Log U t 
- 0 . 3 9 0 
(0.5) 
0.841 
(9-6) 
- 0 . 0 9 7 
(1.1) 
- 1 . 7 9 0 
(2.4) 
- 3 . 2 2 9 
(2.4) 
- 2 . 0 6 5 
(2.1) 
0.187 
(2.4) 
0.012 
(0.1) 
0.104 
(1.2) 
- 0 . 6 8 7 
(4-i) 
- 0 . 2 3 1 
d-5) 
0.94 
1.48 
1.64 
1.49 
Log U t 
-0 -397 
(0.5) 
0.950 
(10.9) 
- 0 . 2 4 6 
(2.8) 
- 2 . 3 8 7 
(3-4) 
- 2 . 9 4 6 
(2.6) 
- 2 . 0 3 7 
(3-9) 
0.176 
(2.5) 
0.041 
(0.3) 
0.106 
(1.2) 
- 0 . 6 4 2 
(4.2) 
-0 .173 
(1.2) 
1.817 
(3-3) 
- 0 . 9 5 2 
(2.5) 
- 0 . 0 2 0 
(1.2) 
0.95 
1.78 
1.13 
5.91 
Log U t 
- 0 . 3 0 6 
(0.4) 
0.966 
(10.9) 
- 0 . 2 4 0 
(2.6) 
-2 -477 
(3-5) 
- 2 . 3 2 3 
(i-9) 
-1-355 
(14) 
0.152 
(2.0) 
0.032 
(0.2) 
0.097 
(1.0) 
- 0 . 3 0 7 
(1.2) 
- 0 . 1 0 5 
(0.7) 
1.628 
(2.7) 
- 0 . 8 7 4 
(2.2) 
- 0 . 0 1 3 
(1.0) 
0.646 
(0.4) 
-1 .362 
(1.2) 
-O.O56 
(1.0) 
O.95 
I.73 
O.95 
5-95 
Log U t 
- 0 . 3 7 8 
(i-3) 
0.935 
(2.6) 
- 0 . 2 0 4 
(2.6) 
-2 .530 
(3-7) 
- 2 . 9 6 7 
(2.6) 
-2 .119 
(2.6) 
0.198 
(2.9) 
- 0 . 6 5 2 
(4-3) 
- 0 . 2 5 8 
(2.1) 
1.919 
(3-6) 
-1 .122 
(3-2) 
0.95 
1.74 
2.75 
3.48 
Notes: ‘t’ statistics in parentheses. RESET is the functional form test using the powers of the 
fitted values, distributed as F ^ - ^ . HETERO is the test for heteroskedasticity using the 
fitted values, distributed as XM • 
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for exogenous demand shocks) is negative as expected, also with a sizeable 
coefficient. The third additional variable is our index of short-run structural 
change. Contrary to expectation, this turns out to be negative but not 
significant and hence differences in the pace of structural change contribute 
very little to explaining medium- and long-term shifts in the average 
unemployment rate. Nevertheless, two out of three additional variables 
matter, and in their presence several of the other coefficients become more 
significant. But they fail to drive away the large negative coefficient on the 
period dummy for the golden age. 
The third column of Table 3 examines the hypothesis that the three 
additional variables had different effects during the golden age than at other 
times. The result of adding interactions with the 1948–71 dummy suggests 
that they did not. Although some of the interacted coefficients are large 
they are not individually significant and the coefficients on the un-interacted 
variables are little changed. The fourth column offers a more parsimonious 
specification in which just two period dummies appear. These indicate that, 
conditioning on other variables, there was a large outward shift in real labour 
demand during the golden age that was partially reversed in the 1980s. For 
given values of the real wage, productivity, and other relevant variables, 
employment was higher and unemployment was lower between 1948 and 
1971 than it was during the other major eras. Precisely how and why this 
occurred remains unclear. 
7. Calculating the NAIRU 
One way of assessing the contribution of different variables to the average 
unemployment rate across these periods is to calculate the NAIRU for each 
period using the empirical counterpart to equation (3) above. Here, the price 
surprise in the unemployment equation is set to zero and the NAIRU is 
calculated by setting all the other variables at their period means. The values 
of the NAIRU presented in Table 4 are based on the estimated wage equation 
in the fourth column of Table 2 and the estimated unemployment equation 
in the fourth column of Table 3. The first row of Table 4 is the observed 
average unemployment rate over each of the periods while the second row 
is the calculated value of the NAIRU. Not surprisingly the NAIRU is fairly 
close to the observed average unemployment rate for each period, although it 
is a little lower than the average for the interwar period and for the post-1979 
period. 
In the next four rows the NAIRU is calculated holding one of the variables 
constant at its average over the whole period 1872–1913, 1922–38, 1948– 
71 and 1980–99. The comparison between the entries in row (2) and the 
following rows isolates the contribution of each of these variables to the 
cross-period differences in the NAIRU. Row (3) holds productivity growth 
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Table 4. Estimates of the NAIRU for different periods. 
1872-1891 1892-1913 1922-1938 1948-1971 1980-1999 
(1) Average unemployment 5.6 6.2 10.8 2.0 11.6 
rate 
Long-run NAIRU 
(2) NAIRU using period 
averages 
(3) NAIRU with constant 
productivity growth 
(4) NAIRU with constant 
fuel price ratio 
(5) NAIRU with constant 
real interest rate 
(6) NAIRU with constant 
world trade growth 
(7) All of above (3-6) 
held constant 
(8) No shift in wage setting 
in 1948-71 
(9) No unemployment shifts 
in 1948-71 and 1980-99 
(10) No shifts in real wage 
or unemployment eqs. 
5-5 
5-i 
7.6 
5-4 
5.0 
6.5 
5-5 
5-5 
5-5 
6.2 
5-4 
7-5 
6.4 
6.0 
6.7 
6.2 
6.2 
6.2 
9.8 
9.6 
11.3 
8.5 
7.6 
9-i 
9.8 
9.8 
9.8 
i-9 
2-3 
i-7 
2.1 
2.1 
2.2 
2.1 
9-9 
10.5 
10.9 
11.5 
7-2 
10.7 
10.4 
7-5 
10.9 
20.8 
20.8 
constant at the whole period average (1.54 per cent per annum). Below-
average productivity growth in the pre-1914 period added modestly to the 
NAIRU, especially from the 1890s to 1913. And above-average productivity 
growth reduced unemployment during the golden age, but only by 0.4 per-
centage points. In row (4), the real fuel price is held constant (at 122.6; 1913 = 
100). Below-average real fuel prices reduced the NAIRU in the periods 
before the Second World War, particularly in 1872-91. But the sharp rise 
in relative fuel prices across the Second World War, and again in the 1970s, 
raised the NAIRU - by 3.7 percentage points in the period after 1979. 
Although the real interest rate has powerful effects in the unemployment 
equation its impact on the NAIRU across major periods is modest (row 5). At 
the whole period average real interest rate (3.22 per cent) the NAIRU would 
have been lower by 1.3 percentage points in the interwar period and a shade 
higher during the golden age. The effects of the growth of world trade are 
also surprisingly modest (row 6). With world trade growth at its whole period 
mean (4.31 per cent) the NAIRU for the interwar period would have been 
two percentage points lower than it was and that for the golden age would 
have been only a shade higher. With all four of these variables simultaneously 
held at their whole-period means as in row (7), the overall pattern of relative 
unemployment rates between periods is largely preserved. Together these 
forces raised the NAIRU slightly in the interwar period, lowered it slightly 
in the postwar period, and raised it more substantially in the post-1979 
period. 
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What were the effects of shifts in the wage setting and unemployment 
equations during the golden age? In row (8) the coefficients of the wage 
equation before and after the golden age are applied to the period 1948– 
71 as well. In this period the NAIRU would have been a shade higher 
in the absence of the shifts in wage setting that characterised the postwar 
consensus. This is largely because of the reversal of the effects of the direct 
tax wedge during the golden age. Thus the postwar consensus, as it applied to 
wage setting, did reduce unemployment slightly. However, the lower NAIRU 
during the golden age is mostly accounted for by the period dummies in the 
unemployment equation. Row (9) gives values of the NAIRU eliminating the 
dummies for 1948–71 and 1980–99. This raises the NAIRU to 9.9 per cent 
for the golden age and to more than 20 per cent for the 1980s and 1990s. 
8. What happened in the 1970s? 
The dramatic fall in the unemployment rate across the Second World War 
seems to have been largely due to a shift in labour demand that cannot 
be accounted for by the economic variables that appear in the model. 
Specifically: for a given ratio of the real wage relative to productivity, 
unemployment was lower than ever before or since. As reflected in the 
changing structure of the wage equation, the postwar consensus had only 
modest effects in reducing unemployment. The turbulent decade of the 
1970s is often seen as a watershed between the low unemployment era of 
the golden age and the return to high equilibrium unemployment more 
characteristic of the interwar period. That much is clear, but it is much less 
clear exactly what accounted for the upward drift in unemployment over 
the decade. Here we investigate three possibilities: the breakdown of the 
postwar consensus, negative shocks emerging from the world economy, and 
the reversal of the favourable shifts in labour demand that took place across 
the Second World War. 
Table 5 reports the results of a series of simulations for the period 1972 
to 1979. The first row shows the actual unemployment rate. After rising to 
4 per cent in 1972, unemployment fell to 2.8 per cent and then rose again 
to reach 6.1 per cent in 1977. The second row is the result of a recursive 
simulation that uses the real wage equation in the last column of Table 2 and 
the unemployment equation in the last column of Table 3. The coefficients 
used are those for the golden age (that is, setting the dummy for 1948–71 
equal to one). The simulation starts from the actual value of the real wage 
for 1971 and the actual values of the unemployment rate for 1970 and 1971. 
Thereafter the values predicted by the model are used as lagged values for 
subsequent years. The unemployment rates that emerge from the simulation 
are a shade lower than the actuals in the early 1970s and the gap increases 
through the late 1970s. Thus more than half of the increase in unemployment 
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Table 5. Counterfactual unemployment 
Ye a r 
(1) Actual unemployment 
rate 
(2) Simulated 
unemployment rate 
(3) No postwar consensus 
(4) No inflation shocks, 
post-1971 
(5) No real interest rate 
decline, post-1971 
(6) No real fuel price 
increase, post-1971 
(7) No productivity 
slowdown, post-1973 
(8) No world trade 
slowdown, post-1971 
(9) No negative shocks: 
(6) and (7) and (8) 
1972 
4.0 
3.6 
3.6 
34 
3-7 
34 
3.6 
3-5 
3-3 
1973 
2.8 
2.7 
2.7 
2.6 
2.8 
2.6 
2.7 
2.5 
2.4 
1974 
2.8 
2.3 
2.3 
2.7 
2.5 
2.2 
2.3 
2.2 
2.0 
in the 
1975 
4-3 
2.8 
2.6 
4.0 
3.0 
2.5 
2.6 
2.6 
2.1 
7970s. 
1976 
5.8 
3-9 
3.6 
4.1 
4.2 
3-3 
34 
3-5 
2.6 
1977 
6.1 
3.8 
3-5 
34 
4.1 
3-i 
3.2 
3-5 
2.3 
1978 
6.0 
4.0 
3-7 
3-5 
4-3 
3-i 
3-3 
3-7 
2.3 
1979 
5.6 
4.0 
3-7 
3.8 
4-3 
3-i 
3.2 
3-7 
2.3 
between 1973 and 1979 is due to shocks or shifts that are not accounted for 
by the simulation. 
Row (3) reports the result of a similar simulation, but this time the 
interactions in the wage equation between the dummy for 1948-71 and 
the direct tax share, the replacement rate, and trade union density, are 
removed. This simulation asks what the unemployment rate would have been 
if the postwar consensus had broken down in 1972 rather than continuing 
through the 1970s. This result should be compared with the simulation in 
the second row. It suggests that in the absence of the postwar consensus 
the unemployment rate would have been the same until 1975. After that, 
unemployment is 0.3 percentage points lower in the absence of the postwar 
consensus than when the wage equation relevant to 1948-71 is used. This 
suggests that the breakdown of the golden age wage-setting structure was 
not the cause of rising unemployment during the 1970s. If anything it was 
the opposite; real wages and unemployment would have been slightly higher 
at the end of the 1970s under the golden age wage-setting regime. 
The 1970s saw a series of other shocks that affected unemployment, some 
positive and some negative. The burst of inflation that peaked in 1975 should 
have helped keep unemployment down, at least until the mid-1970s. Row 
(4) of the Table shows the result of a simulation where, from 1972, the 
inflation rate is held constant (so that the change in inflation is zero). Not 
surprisingly, the simulated unemployment rate is higher than in row (2) in 
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the mid 1970s when inflation was on the rise, especially at the peak of 1975, 
and a little lower in the late 1970s as the inflation rate was falling. Another 
factor that should have been keeping unemployment down is the real interest 
rate. In the years of high inflation real interest rates were lower even than 
the low rates that characterised most of the golden age. From 1972 to 1979 
the real ex ante long-term interest rate lagged one period was close to zero, 
as compared to an average rate for 1948-71 of 1.3 per cent. The simulation 
in row (5) assumes that, in each year from 1972, the real interest rate is 
higher than its actual value by 1.3 percentage points. As compared with the 
simulation in row (2) unemployment is higher by an amount that increases 
from 0.1 percentage points in 1972 to 0.3 percentage points in 1976-79. 
Thus the effects of unanticipated inflation and low real interest rates held 
unemployment down during the 1970s, but only modestly. 
However, there were several other variables that were acting in the opposite 
direction. The increase in real oil prices, the productivity slowdown and 
the slowdown in the growth of world trade are often identified as having 
contributed to the rise in unemployment over the 1970s. The simulations 
in rows (6) through (8) examine the contributions of each of these in turn. 
Had the real fuel price remained at its 1971 level in subsequent years (row 
6), unemployment would have been lower by 0.9 percentage points by 1979. 
Similarly, productivity growth was slower by 1.34 per cent in 1974-79 than it 
had been in the years up to 1973. Raising productivity growth by 1.34 per cent 
after 1973, as in row (7), also cuts unemployment by —0.8 percentage points 
by 1979. And had the growth of world trade not fallen by 2.3 percentage 
points after 1971 the unemployment rate would have been lower, but only 
by 0.3 percentage points in 1979. 
Row (9) shows the simulated result of all three of these effects taken 
together. It clearly implies that negative shocks were important in the 1970s. 
In their absence, the predicted unemployment rate would not have increased 
at all between 1972 and 1979 whereas the simulation in row (2) indicates a 
rise from 2.7 per cent to 4.0 per cent. But the actual unemployment rate 
rose by more than this. How much of that additional increase was due 
to shifts in the structure of the wage and unemployment equations can 
be seen in Figure 2. The Figure compares two simulations that begin in 
1972. One uses the 1948-71 coefficients while the other uses the coefficients 
estimated for 1980-99. Under the golden age regime unemployment rises 
to a peak of 5.3 per cent in 1981 and then begins to decline. By contrast, 
had the change to the post-1980 regime taken place in 1972, unemployment 
would have soared in the mid-1970s by much more than it did. The actual 
unemployment rate exhibits a transition between the two regimes during the 
1970s, with the sharpest rise occurring from 1980.10 Thus, while there was 
10
 The further rise in unemployment after 1980 might be taken to suggest that the data 
period used in estimation for the post-postwar consensus period should have started 
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Figure 2. Unemployment, simulated and actual. 
a gradual regime shift in the 1970s, the more decisive shift was from 1980 
onwards. 
9. Conclusion 
A number of conclusions emerge from our study of unemployment during 
the golden age as compared with the periods before and after. They can be 
summarised as follows: 
• Low unemployment during the golden age was not the result of real wages 
that were set lower relative to productivity than they were in the eras that 
came before or after. 
• If there was a change in the structure of wage setting in the golden age, 
it seems to have cut in both directions. Upward wage pressure from 
unemployment benefits and trade unionism was stronger than at other 
sometime after 1980. But the dynamics of the wage and unemployment equations are 
such that the effect of an intercept shift in the unemployment equation cumulates over the 
following years. This is clearly demonstrated in the simulation where the intercept shift is 
assumed to have occurred in 1972. 
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times, but the negative effect of the tax wedge disappeared. Thus the 
postwar consensus seems to have involved bargaining over the social wage. 
• Faster growth in productivity and in world trade, coupled with lower 
real interest rates than was typical of other economic eras, helped keep 
unemployment low during the golden age, but these effects were small 
overall. 
• The major reason for the low unemployment of the golden age appears to 
have been an outward shift in the labour demand curve, a shift that was 
largely reversed from the 1970s. 
• The return to higher unemployment in the 1970s was not due to a change 
in wage-setting behaviour that might be associated with the demise of the 
postwar consensus. It was partly due to adverse economic conditions and 
partly due to labour demand shifts. 
• The progressive shift in labour demand began in the early 1970s but the 
decisive change came in 1980. 
The shifts in labour demand remain something of a mystery and it is fair 
to say that if explaining low unemployment in the golden age is the holy 
grail, it has not yet been found. Recent studies of unemployment across 
the OECD see these shifts as associated with the sharp decline in labour’s 
share of national income, which has occurred in a number of countries 
since the 1970s. Thus Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) find that a fall in the 
wage relative to the marginal product of labour (a decline in labour’s share) is 
associated with high unemployment because it reflects these adverse demand 
shifts. And Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) suggest that this maybe associated 
with more vigorous deregulation of the labour market than of the product 
market - reducing labour’s rents relative to those on capital, and on balance 
reducing employment. 
While this seems a promising line for further empirical enquiry, there are 
reasons to be sceptical. First, in the UK, labour’s share did not decline in the 
1980s and 1990s as it did in other European countries and yet unemployment 
rose just the same. Second, the estimates of the unemployment equation 
presented above link higher unemployment with a higher share going to 
labour (as represented by the ratio of the real wage to productivity), rather 
than with a lower share - and this seems to be a robust relationship over more 
than a century. Third, the estimates presented here indicate that it is shifts in 
the level of unemployment for a given ratio of the real wage to productivity 
(or for a given share of labour in income) across major economic eras that 
needs to be explained. This suggests that future research should focus on 
the unemployment equation rather than on the wage-setting equation. And 
it would be useful to analyse long-run data for a wider range of countries 
in order to gain a better understanding of what lies behind these infrequent 
shifts in labour demand. 
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Appendix 
Data Sources 
Unemployment rate. Number unemployed divided by the labour force, based on 
postwar definitions from Boyer and Hatton (2002), Appendix Table A2, p. 31. 
1920-1999: number unemployed based on unemployment insurance and claimant 
count measures, adjusted for changes in eligibility conditions in the 1980s, and 
divided by the labour force (below); 1870-1914, based on trade union data and 
other sources, adjusted to the insurance-based estimates for unionised sectors for 
the interwar period and then adjusted to the whole economy using the relationship 
between unemployment in the sectors covered for the nineteenth century and the 
aggregate unemployment rate estimated for 1923-39 and 1948-71. 
Labour force. Unemployed plus employed wage and salary earners. 1920-1999: 
unemployed plus employed wage earners (workforce jobs) derived in Boyer and 
Hatton (2002); 1870-1913: working population net of the armed forces from 
Feinstein (1972), Table 57, pp. T125-6, adjusted to exclude employers and the 
self-employed. 
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Price index. Implicit deflator for G D P at factor cost. 1870-1965: Feinstein (1972), 
Table 61, pp. T132-3 ; 1966-90: Office of National Statistics, Economic Trends, Annual 
Supplement (2000), Table 1.1, p. 7. 
Wage rates. Nominal earnings for full-time manual employees. 1870-1990: 
Feinstein (1995), Table A.24, pp. 263-6; 1990-99: Labour Force Trends (2000), 
Table 3.2, p. 40. 
Replacement rate. Unemployment benefit for an adult male supporting a wife and two 
children (excluding housing and other benefits) relative to average full-time earnings. 
1870-1913: median benefit rate for trade union members covered by benefit schemes 
(set at 10s throughout) , based on Southall (1998), Table 3, p. 23; Royal Commission on 
Labour (1892), vol. 36; Board of Trade (1912), pp. lxxvi-lxxvii; 1920-50: benefit rates 
from Burns (1941), Table 11, p. 368; wage rate 1870-1950, from Feinstein (1995), 
as above; 1951-72: replacement rate from Metcalf et al. (1980), Table 1, pp. 4 -5 ; 
1973-99: replacement rate from an unpublished Bank of England memorandum (by 
H. Bakhshi). 
Proportion eligible for unemployment benefit. 1870-1913: constructed from various 
Board of Trade sources that list the membership of unions that paid benefit; 1920-48: 
insured population from Depar tment of Employment (1971), pp. 210-29, 312-3, 
divided by the labour force (above) and set at 1 from the advent of universal 
unemployment insurance in 1948 onwards. 
Trade union density. Trade union membership as a proport ion of the labour force. 
1892-1977: Bain and Price (1980), Table 2.1, p. 37; 1978-99: Depar tment of 
Trade and Industry <http://www.dti.gov.uk/er/mar/trade.tables.pdf>, divided by the 
labour force (above). For 1870-1892 trade union density from Raehsler (1993), 
Appendix A, pp. 192-3, spliced to the above series at 1892. 
Coverage of national agreements. Coverage of national agreements on collective pay 
setting including statutory Trade Boards and Wage Councils. Calculated (as mid-
point of range, benchmark estimates) from Milner (1994), Table 3. Pre-1974 figures 
are from changes-in-pay-rates data, post-1973 from Workplace Industrial Relations 
survey data. 
Direct tax share. Income tax and National Insurance contributions (excluding taxes 
on capital and property) divided by nominal GDP. 1870-1965: Feinstein (1972), 
Table 14, p. T35; 1966-99: Economic Trends Annual Supplement (2000), Table 5.4, 
p. 245. Nominal G D P at factor cost (income estimate), 1870-1965: Feinstein (1972), 
Table I, p. T35; 1966-1999: Economic Trends Annual Supplement (2000), Table 1.2, 
p. 11. 
Import price/GDP deflator. Import unit value index. 1870-1965: Feinstein (1972), 
Table 64, p. T139; 1966-99: Economic Trends Annual Supplement (2000), Table 1.21, 
p. 131. G D P deflator, 1870-1999, as above. 
Fuel price index/GDP deflator. 1870-1946: pithead price of coal from Church (1986), 
Table 1.9, p. 54, and Supple (1987), Table 1.1, p. 8; crude petroleum import price, 
1921-46 from Jenkins (1986), Table 4, p. 6; 1946-99: price per ton of coal and 
of heavy fuel oil from Jenkins (1986), Table 71, p. 73, and Depar tment of Trade 
and Industry (2000) Table 9.13. Coal and oil price index calculated for 1920-
1999 using weights derived from Jenkins (1986), Table 119, p. 133 and Depar tment 
of Trade and Industry (2000), Table 1.9, p. 34. G D P deflator, 1870-1999, as 
above. 
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Labour productivity. G D P per employed worker. 1870-1965: Feinstein (1972), 
Table 20, p. T51; 1966-1999: Economic Trends Annual Supplement (2000), Table 3.8, 
p. 172. 
Structural change index. Defined as St = £; w; |g;jt — g t | , where w; are value added 
weights, g; and g are one year growth rates of individual industrial sectors and G D P 
respectively. This index ranges between zero (when all sectors grow at the same rate 
as the aggregate and hence there is no structural change) and one. Calculated based 
on 12 sectors: agriculture, mining and quarrying, manufacturing, construction, gas 
electricity and water, t ransport and communication, distributive trades, banking 
and insurance, dwellings, professional and scientific, miscellaneous services, and 
public administration. 1870-1938: using component series from Feinstein (1972), 
Table 8, p. T 2 4 - 5 , Table 51, p. T111-3, Table 53, p. T116-7; 1947-99; from series 
at <http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/TSD/timezone.asp>, and various issues of 
C S O United Kingdom National Accounts. 
World trade volume. 1881-1950: Calculated from Lewis (1952), Table 1, p. 106-7 
and Table 2, p. 117-8; 1950-99: World Trade Organization <http://www.wto.org/ 
english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm>; 1870-81: world trade value index from 
Tinbergen (1956), Table iA, deflated using price index calculated from Lewis. 
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